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From 1950 to 1994 Harry Pratter taught law at Indiana University-
Bloomington.1 One of his favorite sayings (he had many of these) was Maitland’s 
“[T]aught law is tough law,”2 a phrase that a forty-four year teaching career entitles 
you to utter with some frequency. In response to Sartre’s notorious challenge, “Do 
you have anything to say?” Pratter could certainly answer yes.3 He took Sartre 
literally. Pratter preferred to speak—that is to teach, and not to write. The source of 
Pratter’s strong preference for speech over writing must remain a mystery. The 
consequence is that a good deal of what he thought and said has not been 
preserved.  
That’s a shame because Harry Pratter had something to say that was well worth 
hearing. The hope is that this essay will be able to convey something of the flavor 
and tenor of Harry Pratter’s thought. 
 
A. PARADOX AND LAW 
 
Pratter was fond of paradox because he believed that an internally contradictory 
statement that provoked productive thought could generate true insight, if not 
absolute truth. And he much preferred the former over the latter because it is more 
human. If Pratter was about anything, it was the human, especially young people 
like law students. 
Does paradox grant insight into the law? One example suggests an affirmative 
answer; could it ever be permissible, even required, for an attorney to advise her 
client to violate the law? Now, the question itself doesn’t harbor an internal 
contradiction, but the conduct it speaks of certainly does. Attorneys are people of 
the law. They are bound to it and this carries with it the ineluctable duty to follow 
the law themselves and to advise their clients to do the same. 
In the summer of 1979, Bob Knight, the coach of the Hoosiers basketball team, 
was coaching the United States men’s team at the Pan-American Games in San 
Juan, Puerto Rico.4 Knight and the team arrived at a gym for a scheduled practice.5 
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The Brazilian women’s team was still on the floor and didn’t leave.6 Knight started 
onto the floor and was stopped by a police officer.7 An argument ensued during 
which the officer, perhaps not intentionally, jabbed Knight in the eye, leading 
Knight, perhaps in a defensive gesture, to shove the police officer with an open 
hand.8 Of course, Knight was six feet five inches tall and weighed about 220 
pounds.9 Knight was arrested for assault on a police officer.10 On the morning of 
the championship game, Knight made a first appearance in court and was granted 
bail.11 
On returning to Bloomington, Knight consulted with his attorney and with 
Pratter, his friend and informal legal advisor.. Knight asked the elemental question: 
“What should I do?” Their considered advice to Knight? “Do not go back to Puerto 
Rico.”12 
Now, of course there were good instrumental reasons for giving Knight the 
advice to jump bail. The charge, while certainly not petty, was a misdemeanor, and 
extradition for misdemeanors is rare. And the attorneys calculated that even if 
Puerto Rico attempted to extradite, Indiana governor Otis Bowen would probably 
refuse to accede. As it turned out, Puerto Rico did try to extradite Knight and 
Bowen did indeed refuse to agree to it.13 But, as Pratter liked to say, will 
instrumental reasons standing alone cut the mustard? He didn’t think so. Before 
advising a client to break the law, the attorney needs principled reasons for 
asserting that a client has a duty, and a compelling one, to act as counseled. 
Here enter extra-legal, or perhaps better, meta-legal considerations. This is not a 
cop-out, as Pratter would say. But can or ought such reasons be taught in law 
school? Now we see the value of a liberal education, something in which Pratter 
believed strongly, just as he believed in the humane value of a strictly legal 
education. It was always a point of pride with him that law school welcomes 
students with degrees even in French, or Art History, or Uralic-Altaic Studies, or 
musicology. 
The reasons applicable to our case will not be hard to seek for anyone who has 
worked in history, literature, or philosophy. Pratter preferred to illustrate this 
tension through reference to Franz Kafka. Should Josef K., the protagonist of 
Kafka’s Der Process, have permitted himself to be subjected to the interminably 
soul-destroying process at law that he suffered without complaint? Should he 
docilely have allowed himself to be conducted by his strangely attired executioners 
down into the stone quarry to have a long knife jammed into his chest, the blade 
twisted there, while his neighbors looked on impassively from their apartment 
windows? Pratter thought not. On the contrary, he thought that Josef K. had a duty 
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to himself to resist, even if it meant failing to appear for one of the horrifyingly 
absurd hearings that dotted his progress toward annihilation. Josef K. failed 
tragically in this duty to himself. The reasons are imponderable and certainly won’t 
be explicated here. Pratter read the book, learned the lesson, and was tough enough 
to apply it in his own life when the occasion arose. 
Is the juxtaposition of Josef K.’s fate with that of Bob Knight before Puerto 
Rican justice an invidious one? That is essentially an empirical question. Pratter 
considered the facts as he saw them, knew the law as he understood it, and gave the 
advice he thought it right to give. In other words, he acted as a good lawyer. 
 
B. “TOO RICH!” 
Are there objects of inquiry that end up exceeding our capacity to comprehend 
them in their fullness because they present so many facets to our attention and 
generate so many knock-on implications in all directions? Pratter certainly thought 
so. For instance, we can contemplate the infinite, but it would be sheer hubris to 
claim it was intelligible. Not even the most original and creative cosmologist, at 
least one with any modesty, would dare to assert that he could understand and 
explain the origins of the universe and its workings.  
Pratter reveled in this phenomenon, that all our efforts could encounter a limit, 
set perhaps paradoxically by the protean nature of the object itself. When, so to 
speak, he hit his head on the ceiling, he thought it told him a good deal both about 
the contents of the room in which he found himself, and about what might be 
lurking in the attic. When this happened, and his former colleagues probably would 
report it happened a lot, he would exclaim, “It’s too rich for the human mind to 
comprehend!” This was not just a way of ending a conversation. Rather, he meant 
to indicate that the conversation had reached both a productive and natural stopping 
point. 
Is this phenomenon true of that very human activity, the law? It is no insult to 
human intelligence or to the legal species to affirm that it is. In exploring this, we 
ab initio rule out the seminar on law and religion, as otherwise we would be 
cheating. Jurisprudence should probably be disqualified as well, because it would 
be unfair to make things too easy. 
Pratter plied his trade in the field of commercial law, and in there his favorite 
acreage was the Uniform Commercial Code. On more than one occasion he asked, 
“Have you ever looked at Article 1?” without elaborating. Article 1 is not 
substantive in the sense that it does not creates primary rights and duties.14 Not all 
of it is of equal interest, but several sections stand out. One of these is 1-303(d): 
 
(d) A course of performance or course of dealing 
between the parties or usage of trade in the vocation or 
trade in which they are engaged or of which they are 
or should be aware is relevant in ascertaining the 
meaning of the parties’ agreement, and may 
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supplement or qualify the terms of the agreement. 15 
 
It is worth noting that 1-303(d) refers directly to extra-legal sources of norms in 
the sense that these are neither a statute, case, administrative regulation, nor 
constitution. Rather, the source of the norm is the non-normative practices of the 
parties to the agreement, their trade usages or course of dealing.  
But how do we get from the facts of their practices to a legal rule governing 
their agreement? Section 1-303(d) doesn’t speak to that. Maybe we should only 
adopt the parties’ practices as normative if they understood that was what they 
were doing, but that may well not always be the case. 
We may have found ourselves in a puzzling place—practices become the rule 
even though the practitioners don’t recognize they are generating rules through 
their actions. It is almost as if the classic is/ought distinction has collapsed before 
our eyes. This is not much of an example. Would we be justified in exclaiming 
“Too rich!” at this point? Probably not. But as previously explained, the hope is to 
give the flavor of Pratter’s thought, nothing more. 
 
C. ATHLETIC GRACE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF PERFECTION 
 
Harry Pratter was a sports fan; he made no apologies for that. What do sports 
have to do with law? Perhaps very little, but that is exactly the point. Of course, 
this could be easily contradicted. The NCAA, for example, is a legal behemoth. 
Pratter showed on more than one occasion that he was capable of taking on the 
NCAA. He didn’t have much choice; he was both a member of the Athletic 
Committee and a friend of Knight. 
Pratter was a sports fan, but not himself an athlete. He tried to assure that his 
three sons learned to run, catch, throw, and swim. He could not swim himself. He 
did grow up playing stickball and handball in the streets and parks of Buffalo, New 
York, so he knew the meaning of tough competition.  
For him sports was the best terre-à-terre instance he could find of grace under 
pressure. To him, American football was akin to ballet. If the comparison is 
deemed invidious, consider what ballet can do to a dancer after about five years, 
the span allotted to the typical pro running back. Back damage, shin splints, stress 
fractures, knee injuries, harm to feet, arthritis, even anorexia. Those can be the 
costs of grace in many sports.  
This wasn’t the case for swimmers. Pratter was friends with James “Doc” 
Councilman, the coach of the Indiana University men’s swim team in its glory 
years. Councilman taught Pratter a lot about swimming, from stroke mechanics to 
innovative weight-training techniques that worked muscles not reached in most 
standard repertoires of lifts. It is impossible to forget the look of stunned 
amazement on Pratter’s face as he watched Janet Evans digging and digging her 
way to the gold medal in the 400 meter freestyle at the 1988 Summer Olympics in 
Seoul. Evans faced huge odds. First, there was the existential fact that she gave 
away six inches in height and almost as much in reach. As in boxing, these are 
critical factors in swimming. Furthermore, there was the disturbing contingent fact 
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that steroid use by the East German team infected the women’s swimming 
competition at the Seoul Olympics. None of that seemed to matter to Evans. 
Perhaps she was too young to know what she was up against.  
Despite her unorthodox freestyle stroke, Harry knew he had witnessed a perfect 
swim. But it wasn’t perfection for the sake of perfection that interested him. What 
he wanted was a perfect instance of human striving to swim as hard and well as 
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